Generalising Rule-Governed Behaviour Across Levels: The Research Underpinning the article “Decoding the Operating System of Behaviour”

This article is a continuation of my article from last week introducing the practical relevance of ‘rule-governed behaviour’ for thinking about groups, relationships and collaboration. In this article, I will take a much deeper dive into the behavioural science of rule-governed behaviour and discuss why I am excited about combining this work with Elinor Ostrom’s research from a political science and economics perspective, which examines similar phenomena. I believe that, if we were able to recognise and discuss tacit rules in use at the individual, group and systemic levels, we would be much better placed to create a shared perspective on our most significant problems and find ways forward together.

Convergent evidence from across the social sciences reveals why "the way we've always done it" is so hard to change.

Like well-worn paths that guide our footsteps through familiar terrain, verbal rules create invisible behavioural highways in our minds and communities. These cognitive pathways, carved deeper with each use, help us navigate complex social situations without constant deliberation.

Have you ever wondered why intelligent groups continue doing things that clearly don't work? Or why changing "the way we've always done it" feels nearly impossible, even when everyone agrees the current approach is failing?

The answer lies in understanding how verbal rules (statements about "if you do X, then Y will happen") can both accelerate learning and create persistent dysfunction in everything from intimate relationships to global institutions.

This isn't just academic theory. Convergent evidence from behavioural science, political science, and institutional economics reveals that rule-governed behaviour operates as a fundamental mechanism across multiple levels of human organisation, and understanding it gives us tools for both diagnosis and change.

The Science Behind "That's Just How We Do Things"

In Contextual Behavioural Science (CBS), we distinguish between two types of behavioural control (Hayes et al., 1986; Zettle & Hayes, 1982):

Contingency-shaped behaviour: Learning through direct experience. Touch a hot stove, get burned, avoid hot stoves.

Rule-governed behaviour: Learning through verbal instructions. Someone tells you "if you touch hot stoves, you'll get burned" and you avoid them without direct experience.

This distinction matters because rule-governed behaviour shows three crucial properties:

1. Faster acquisition (rules allow rapid learning without trial-and-error)

2. Reduced variability (more consistent but less creative responding)

3. Contingency insensitivity (crucially, rule-following can persist even when environmental consequences change)

That last property explains why smart groups get trapped in obviously dysfunctional patterns.

Before we go further, it's crucial to understand that rules aren't inherently problematic. Watch a synchronized swimming team or a flock of starlings moving as one, and you're witnessing the beautiful power of shared rules creating coordinated action. The issue isn't the existence of behavioural pathways—it's when those pathways become so rigid that groups can't adapt when the terrain changes.

Political Science Discovers the Same Pattern

Remarkably, political scientists Elinor Ostrom and Sue Crawford reached strikingly similar conclusions through entirely different research (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995). Their institutional analysis framework identifies three types of statements that guide collective behaviour:

• Shared strategies (AIC): "In this situation, doing X usually leads to Y"

• Norms (ADIC): "In this situation, you should/shouldn't do X"

• Rules (ADICO): "In this situation, you must/may/must not do X, or else Z will happen"

Notice the structural similarity? Both approaches recognise that verbal formulations specifying if-then relationships can control behaviour independently of immediate environmental feedback.

Crawford and Ostrom's ADICO syntax maps precisely onto behavioural contingency analysis (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995):

• Attributes = who the rule applies to

• Deontic + Aim = the behaviour specified

• Conditions = when the rule applies

• Or Else = consequences for violations

The Multi-Level Nature of Rule Systems

Here's where it gets interesting. Like a fractal pattern that repeats at different scales, rule-governed behaviour doesn't just operate at the individual level, but scales up to shape group dynamics, organisational culture, and even societal institutions (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). The same pathway-carving mechanism manifests across every level of human organisation:

Individual level: A therapist operating under the tacit rule "Never admit uncertainty or you'll be seen as incompetent" even when authentic uncertainty would actually build client trust.

Group level: A nonprofit team following "Important decisions require unanimous consensus", leading to endless discussions that prevent any decision-making, undermining their mission.

Organisational level: Academic institutions reinforcing "Publish only in high-impact journals, regardless of practical relevance", creating perverse incentives that prioritise career advancement over knowledge creation.

Societal level: Economic systems following "Growth must be maximised regardless of environmental cost", persisting even as evidence mounts that this threatens long-term sustainability.

Why Rules Become Rigid

Both CBS and institutional analysis reveal why rule systems become resistant to change:

1. Rules often outlive their original purpose. They persist because they receive social approval rather than environmental validation.

2. Derived relational networks expand. A rule like "challenging authority creates conflict" generates related contingencies: "agreement prevents conflict," "conflict threatens cohesion," "cohesion requires deference."

3. Monitoring and enforcement systems develop. Once established, rule systems create their own supporting infrastructure that has vested interests in maintaining them.

4. Meta-rules emerge about rules. Groups develop rules about when to follow or change other rules — and these are often more conservative than the original rules.

From Diagnosis to Intervention

Understanding rule-governed behaviour provides both diagnostic tools and intervention strategies. Rather than asking "What's wrong with these people?" we can ask "What verbal rules are controlling behaviour here?"

Making Implicit Rules Explicit

Listen for linguistic markers:

• "That's just how we do things here"

• "We tried that before and it didn't work"

• "That's not how our industry operates"

These phrases typically signal underlying contingency statements worth examining.

Functional Analysis of Rules

Deconstruct rules using the three-term contingency:

• Antecedent: Under what conditions does this rule apply?

• Behaviour: What specific actions does the rule prescribe?

• Consequence: What outcomes does following the rule supposedly produce?

Often, groups follow rules with incomplete or outdated contingency specifications.

Building Contingency Sensitivity

The goal isn't eliminating all behavioural pathways—they clearly serve essential coordination functions, like the neural pathways that allow a jazz quartet to improvise together seamlessly. Instead, we want to foster meta-contingencies: rules about when to follow familiar paths and when to forge new routes based on environmental feedback.

This requires helping groups develop what CBS calls "psychological flexibility" (the ability to follow rules when they serve valued outcomes and abandon them when they don't) (Hayes et al., 2011).

A Healthcare Example

A healthcare organisation operated under the tacit rule: "When patients complain, defend institutional practices to avoid legal liability." This rule had emerged from legitimate risk management concerns but created a defensive culture that impeded quality improvement.

Through systematic analysis, the leadership team discovered that defensive responses actually increased legal exposure while damaging patient relationships. The rule was producing consequences opposite to its stated purpose.

The intervention involved creating a new rule with better environmental sensitivity: "When patients complain, listen empathetically and identify system improvements to increase satisfaction and reduce future complaints."

The shift required months of reinforcement as the new rule competed with established patterns, but eventually produced measurable improvements in both patient satisfaction and legal outcomes.

The Broader Implications

This convergent evidence from behavioural science, political science, and institutional economics (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Hayes et al., 1986) suggests that sustainable change (whether personal, organisational, or societal) requires more than policy reform or leadership changes. It requires systematic attention to the verbal rule systems that guide collective behaviour.

Whether we're addressing organisational dysfunction, political polarisation, or global coordination challenges, interventions must target the verbal contingencies that maintain problematic patterns while preserving the coordination benefits of rules.

Understanding the hidden code of rule-governed behaviour may be essential for navigating the complex social challenges of our time.

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What recurring frustrations do you notice in your work or community? Can you identify the tacit rule operating in the form: "In this situation, do this, to achieve this outcome"? What happens when you examine whether that rule still serves its stated purpose?

References

Crawford, S. E. S., & Ostrom, E. (1995). A grammar of institutions. American Political Science Review, 89(3), 582-600.

Hayes, S. C., Brownstein, A. J., Zettle, R. D., Rosenfarb, I., & Korn, Z. (1986). Rule-governed behavior and sensitivity to changing consequences of responding. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 45(3), 237-256.

Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J. B., Bond, F. W., Masuda, A., & Lillis, J. (2011). Acceptance and commitment therapy: Model, processes and outcomes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44(1), 1-25.

North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton University Press.

Zettle, R. D., & Hayes, S. C. (1982). Rule-governed behavior: A potential theoretical framework for cognitive-behavioral therapy. Advances in Cognitive-Behavioral Research and Therapy, 1, 73-118.